Considerations on Representative GovernmentMill, John Stuart
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Considerations on Representative Government
Mill, John Stuart
Representative government and representation
In the most recently established of our local representative
institutions, the Boards of Guardians, the justices of peace of the
district sit _ex officio_ along with the elected members, in number
limited by law to a third of the whole. In the peculiar constitution
of English society, I have no doubt of the beneficial effect of this
provision. It secures the presence in these bodies of a more educated
class than it would perhaps be practicable to attract thither on any
other terms; and while the limitation in number of the _ex officio_
members precludes them from acquiring predominance by mere numerical
strength, they, as a virtual representation of another class, having
sometimes a different interest from the rest, are a check upon the
class interests of the farmers or petty shopkeepers who form the bulk
of the elected guardians. A similar commendation can not be given to
the constitution of the only provincial boards we possess, the Quarter
Sessions, consisting of the justices of peace alone, on whom, over and
above their judicial duties, some of the most important parts of the
administrative business of the country depend for their performance.
The mode of formation of these bodies is most anomalous, they being
neither elected, nor, in any proper sense of the term, nominated, but
holding their important functions, like the feudal lords to whom they
succeeded, virtually by right of their acres; the appointment vested
in the crown (or, speaking practically, in one of themselves, the lord
lieutenant) being made use of only as a means of excluding any one who
it is thought would do discredit to the body, or, now and then, one
who is on the wrong side in politics. The institution is the most
aristocratic in principle which now remains in England; far more so
than the House of Lords, for it grants public money and disposes of
important public interests, not in conjunction with a popular
assembly, but alone. It is clung to with proportionate tenacity by our
aristocratic classes, but is obviously at variance with all the
principles which are the foundation of representative government. In a
County Board there is not the same justification as in Boards of
Guardians for even an admixture of _ex officio_ with elected members,
since the business of a county being on a sufficiently large scale to
be an object of interest and attraction to country gentlemen, they
would have no more difficulty in getting themselves elected to the
Board than they have in being returned to Parliament as county
members.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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