Considerations on Representative GovernmentMill, John Stuart
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Considerations on Representative Government
Mill, John Stuart
Representative government and representation
On every other subject the question depends on how
closely the people in general wish to draw the federal tie; what
portion of their local freedom of action they are willing to
surrender, in order to enjoy more fully the benefit of being one
nation.
Respecting the fitting constitution of a federal government within
itself, much need not be said. It of course consists of a legislative
branch and an executive, and the constitution of each is amenable to
the same principles as that of representative governments generally.
As regards the mode of adapting these general principles to a federal
government, the provision of the American Constitution seems
exceedingly judicious, that Congress should consist of two houses, and
that while one of them is constituted according to population, each
state being entitled to representatives in the ratio of the number of
its inhabitants, the other should represent not the citizens, but the
state governments, and every state, whether large or small, should be
represented in it by the same number of members. This provision
precludes any undue power from being exercised by the more powerful
states over the rest, and guarantees the reserved rights of the state
governments by making it impossible, as far as the mode of
representation can prevent, that any measure should pass Congress
unless approved not only by a majority of the citizens, but by a
majority of the states. I have before adverted to the further
incidental advantage obtained of raising the standard of
qualifications in one of the houses. Being nominated by select bodies,
the Legislatures of the various states, whose choice, for reasons
already indicated, is more likely to fall on eminent men than any
popular election--who have not only the power of electing such, but a
strong motive to do so, because the influence of their state in the
general deliberations must be materially affected by the personal
weight and abilities of its representatives--the Senate of the United
States, thus chosen, has always contained nearly all the political men
of established and high reputation in the Union; while the Lower House
of Congress has, in the opinion of competent observers, been generally
as remarkable for the absence of conspicuous personal merit, as the
Upper House for its presence.
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