Considerations on Representative GovernmentMill, John Stuart
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Considerations on Representative Government
Mill, John Stuart
Representative government and representation
feel the withholding of an advantage from even one person, because of
a circumstance which they all have in common with him, an affront to
all. If we prevent the leading men of a community from standing forth
to the world as its chiefs and representatives in the general councils
of mankind, we owe it both to their legitimate ambition and to the
just pride of the community to give them in return an equal chance of
occupying the same prominent position in a nation of greater power and
importance. Were the whole service of the British crown opened to the
natives of the Ionian Islands, we should hear no more of the desire
for union with Greece. Such a union is not desirable for the people,
to whom it would be a step backward in civilization; but it is no
wonder if Corfu, which has given a minister of European reputation to
the Russian Empire, and a president to Greece itself before the
arrival of the Bavarians, should feel it a grievance that its people
are not admissable to the highest posts in some government or other.
Thus far of the dependencies whose population is in a sufficiently
advanced state to be fitted for representative government; but there
are others which have not attained that state, and which, if held at
all, must be governed by the dominant country, or by persons delegated
for that purpose by it. This mode of government is as legitimate as
any other, if it is the one which in the existing state of
civilization of the subject people most facilitates their transition
to a higher stage of improvement. There are, as we have already seen,
conditions of society in which a vigorous despotism is in itself the
best mode of government for training the people in what is
specifically wanting to render them capable of a higher civilization.
There are others, in which the mere fact of despotism has indeed no
beneficial effect, the lessons which it teaches having already been
only too completely learned, but in which, there being no spring of
spontaneous improvement in the people themselves, their almost only
hope of making any steps in advance depends on the chances of a good
despot. Under a native despotism, a good despot is a rare and
transitory accident; but when the dominion they are under is that of a
more civilized people, that people ought to be able to supply it
constantly. The ruling country ought to be able to do for its subjects
all that could be done by a succession of absolute monarchs,
guaranteed by irresistible force against the precariousness of tenure
attendant on barbarous despotisms, and qualified by their genius to
anticipate all that experience has taught to the more advanced nation.
Such is the ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous or
semi-barbarous one. We need not expect to see that ideal realized;
but, unless some approach to it is, the rulers are guilty of a
dereliction of the highest moral trust which can devolve upon a
nation; and if they do not even aim at it, they are selfish usurpers,
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account