the impeachment of the four lords, Portland, Orford, Somers, and Halifax, on that account. But we must at the same time remark, that it is more easy to vindicate the partition treaties themselves, than to reconcile the conduct of the king and of some others with the principles established in our constitution. William had taken these important negotiations wholly into his own hands, not even communicating them to any of his English ministers, except Lord Jersey, until his resolution was finally settled. Lord Somers, as chancellor, had put the great seal to blank powers, as a legal authority to the negotiators; which evidently could not be valid, unless on the dangerous principle that the seal is conclusive against all exception.[221] He had also sealed the ratification of the treaty, though not consulted upon it, and though he seems to have had objections to some of the terms; and in both instances he set up the king's command as a sufficient defence. The exclusion of all those whom, whether called privy or cabinet counsellors, the nation holds responsible for its safety, from this great negotiation, tended to throw back the whole executive government into the single will of the sovereign, and ought to have exasperated the House of Commons far more than the actual treaties of partition, which may probably have been the safest choice in a most perilous condition of Europe. The impeachments however were in most respects so ill substantiated by proof, that they have generally been reckoned a disgraceful instance of party spirit.[222]