This from henceforth will become our standard of constitutional law, instead of the statute of Edward III., the latterly received interpretations of which it sanctions and embodies. But it is to be noted as the doctrine of our most approved authorities, that a conspiracy for many purposes which, if carried into effect, would incur the guilt of treason, will not of itself amount to it. The constructive interpretation of compassing the king's death appears only applicable to conspiracies, whereof the intent is to depose or to use personal compulsion towards him, or to usurp the administration of his government.[233] But though insurrections in order to throw down all enclosures, to alter the established law or change religion, or in general for the reformation of alleged grievances of a public nature, wherein the insurgents have no special interest, are in themselves treasonable, yet the previous concert and conspiracy for such purpose could, under the statute of Edward III., only pass for a misdemeanour. Hence, while it has been positively laid down, that an attempt by intimidation and violence to force the repeal of a law is high treason,[234] though directed rather against the two houses of parliament than the king's person, the judges did not venture to declare that a mere conspiracy and consultation to raise a force for that purpose would amount to that offence.[235] But the statutes of 36 & 57 Geo. 3 determine the intention to levy war, in order to put any force upon or to intimidate either house of parliament, manifested by any overt act, to be treason, and so far have undoubtedly extended the scope of the law. We may hope that so ample a legislative declaration on the law of treason will put an end to the preposterous interpretations which have found too much countenance on some not very distant occasions. The crime of compassing and imagining the king's death must be manifested by some overt act; that is, there must be something done in execution of a traitorous purpose. For as no hatred towards the person of the sovereign, nor any longings for his death, are the imagination which the law here intends, it seems to follow that loose words or writings, in which such hostile feelings may be embodied, unconnected with any positive design, cannot amount to treason. It is now therefore generally agreed, that no words will constitute that offence, unless as evidence of some overt act of treason; and the same appears clearly to be the case with respect at least to unpublished writings.[236]