_Independence of judges._--It had been the practice of the Stuarts, especially in the last years of their dynasty, to dismiss judges, without seeking any other pretence, who showed any disposition to thwart government in political prosecutions. The general behaviour of the bench had covered it with infamy. Though the real security for an honest court of justice must be found in their responsibility to parliament and to public opinion, it was evident that their tenure in office must, in the first place, cease to be precarious, and their integrity rescued from the severe trial of forfeiting the emoluments upon which they subsisted. In the debates previous to the declaration of rights, we find that several speakers insisted on making the judges' commissions _quamdiu se bene gesserint_, that is, during life or good behaviour, instead of _durante placito_, at the discretion of the Crown. The former, indeed, is said to have been the ancient course till the reign of James I. But this was omitted in the hasty and imperfect bill of rights. The commissions however of William's judges ran _quamdiu se bene gesserint_. But the king gave an unfortunate instance of his very injudicious tenacity of bad prerogatives, in refusing his assent, in 1692, to a bill that had passed both houses, for establishing this independence of the judges by law and confirming their salaries.[287] We owe this important provision to the act of settlement; not as ignorance and adulation have perpetually asserted, to his late majesty George III. No judge can be dismissed from office, except in consequence of a conviction for some offence, or the address of both houses of parliament, which is tantamount to an act of the legislature.[288] It is always to be kept in mind that they are still accessible to the hope of further promotion, to the zeal of political attachment, to the flattery of princes and ministers; that the bias of their prejudices, as elderly and peaceable men, will, in a plurality of cases, be on the side of power; that they have very frequently been trained, as advocates, to vindicate every proceeding of the Crown; from all which we should look on them with some little vigilance, and not come hastily to a conclusion that, because their commissions cannot be vacated by the Crown's authority, they are wholly out of the reach of its influence. I would by no means be misinterpreted, as if the general conduct of our courts of justice since the revolution, and especially in later times, which in most respects have been the best times, were not deserving of that credit it has usually gained; but possibly it may have been more guided and kept straight than some are willing to acknowledge by the spirit of observation and censure which modifies and controls our whole government.