It seems difficult for any king of England, however conscientiously observant of the lawful rights of his subjects, and of the limitations they impose on his prerogative, to rest always very content with this practical condition of the monarchy. The choice of his counsellors, the conduct of government, are intrusted, he will be told, by the constitution to his sole pleasure. Yet both in the one and the other he finds a perpetual disposition to restrain his exercise of power; and, though it is easy to demonstrate that the public good is far better promoted by the virtual control of parliament and the nation over the whole executive government, than by adhering to the letter of the constitution, it is not to be expected that the argument will be conclusive to a royal understanding. Hence, he may be tempted to play rather a petty game, and endeavour to regain, by intrigue and insincerity, that power of acting by his own will, which he thinks unfairly wrested from him. A king of England, in the calculations of politics, is little more than one among the public men of the day; taller indeed, like Saul or Agamemnon, by the head and shoulders, and therefore with no slight advantages in the scramble; but not a match for the many, unless he can bring some dexterity to second his strength, and make the best of the self-interest and animosities of those with whom he has to deal. And of this there will generally be so much, that in the long run he will be found to succeed in the greater part of his desires. Thus George I. and George II., in whom the personal authority seems to have been at the lowest point it has ever reached, drew their ministers, not always willingly, into that course of continental politics which was supposed to serve the purposes of Hanover far better than of England. It is well known that the Walpoles and the Pelhams condemned in private this excessive predilection of their masters for their native country, which alone could endanger their English throne.[409] Yet after the two latter brothers had inveighed against Lord Granville, and driven him out of power for seconding the king's pertinacity in continuing the war of 1743, they went on themselves in the same track for at least two years, to the imminent hazard of losing for ever the Low Countries and Holland, if the French government, so indiscriminately charged with ambition, had not displayed extraordinary moderation at the treaty of Aix la Chapelle. The twelve years that ensued gave more abundant proofs of the submissiveness with which the schemes of George II. for the good of Hanover were received by his ministers, though not by his people; but the most striking instance of all is the abandonment by Mr. Pitt himself of all his former professions in pouring troops into Germany. I do not inquire whether a sense of national honour might not render some of these measures justifiable, though none of them were advantageous; but it is certain that the strong bent of the king's