"In case of the failure of such manufacturer to pay to the copyright proprietor within thirty days after demand in writing the full sum of royalties due at said rate at the date of such demand the court may award taxable costs to the plaintiff and a reasonable counsel fee, and the court may, in its discretion, enter judgment therein for any sum in addition over the amount found to be due as royalty in accordance with the terms of this Act, not exceeding three times such amount. {Sidenote: Public performance} "The reproduction or rendition of a musical composition by or upon coin-operated machines shall not be deemed a public performance for profit unless a fee is charged for admission to the place where such reproduction or rendition occurs." This provision, though somewhat involved in form, tells its own story, and there has thus far been no occasion for judicial construction. {Sidenote: The compromise result} In the series of discussions before the Committees, the friends of copyright argued for the exclusive and unrestricted right of the musical composer to control absolutely the mechanical reproductions of his work, while the representatives of "canned music" argued at first that mechanical reproduction should be permitted without reference to copyright, and later that there should be entire liberty to make reproductions of a musical work on the sole condition of a specified payment to the copyright proprietor. The provision as actually adopted was a compromise upholding the negative right of the author to prevent mechanical reproduction, but requiring him, in the event of a grant of authority to any one manufacturer to reproduce his work mechanically, to extend that privilege to any other manufacturer on payment of the specified royalty. This scheme is practically modeled on what was known as the Pearsall-Smith royalty plan, which, as proposed for books, was stoutly fought by the proponents of the copyright act of 1891, throughout that memorable copyright campaign. {Sidenote: Judicial construction}