On the other hand, in the case of Brady _v._ Daly, which came before the U. S. Supreme Court in 1899, the defendants, on a question of jurisdiction, raised the issue that the old law provided for a penalty and not for damages, in denying which Justice Peckham held that: "The statute in using the word 'damages' did not mean a forfeiture or penalty, as it is difficult to prove the exact amount which the proprietor of a play may suffer by reason of an infringement. It is probable that Congress intended to provide a remedy so that the proprietor could recover a certain amount of damages without proof of what his actual loss had been. In the face of the difficulty of determining the amount of damages, a minimum sum is provided in any case, with the possibility of recovering a larger amount on proof of greater damage. The idea of punishment is not so much suggested as the desire to provide for compensation to the proprietor." This rule was applied by Judge Lacombe in Patterson _v_. Ogilvie, in 1902. {Sidenote: Other procedure decisions} In the case of Falk _v._ Curtis Pub. Co., which came before the U. S. Circuit Court in Pennsylvania twice in 1900, some important decisions or indications as to copyright procedure were given. The defense that under the copyright act the words "any person" did not include a corporation was overruled by Judge Dallas on the ground that the general statute specifically construed the word "person" to extend to partnerships and corporations. In this case an action to recover penalties and an action to replevin copies in possession were started independently and simultaneously, and the Circuit Court of Appeals through Judge Buffington affirmed the decision that as the penalties under the old act were restricted to copies "found in possession," the suit for penalties was premature. In the later case of Rinehart _v._ Smith, also in the Pennsylvania circuit, it was pointed out that an action for replevin was not the proper form of suit because in such actions bonds might be given and the forfeiture of copies thus be barred; and in Hegeman _v._ Springer, the Circuit Court in New York held, in 1901, that a replevin suit, involving prior demand, was not necessary and that the copyright statute itself gave authority for an action for seizure without previous demand, as would be necessary in replevin proceedings. It was held, however, in the Illinois circuit in an earlier case, that a suit of replevin will lie to enforce forfeiture under the copyright act. Several of these perplexities, however, are removed by the code of 1909, which expressly (sec. 27) authorizes the bringing together of all the remedies in one action. {Sidenote: Preventive action}