Friday, July 6.--Mr. BROUGHAM rose at a few minutes after ten to resume his speech. He had yesterday gone through a long and unbroken series of precedents, showing that no king of England had ever been crowned, he being married at the time of his coronation, without his consort participating in that ceremony. Having gone so far, he contended that he had a right to assume his larger proposition, that queens-consort had, at all times throughout the ages of English history, themselves enjoyed the ceremony of the coronation. If in one or two instances this was not done at the time when the king's own coronation took place, and supposing that there was an instance or two where the queen-consort became such after the coronation of the king, still he would affirm, that according to all the rules of argument, of law, and of common sense, those few instances, (admitting there were some, though in point of strict fact he believed there were none,) did not in any manner or degree affect his general argument, which he held upon the authorities he had cited to be altogether incontrovertible. He was not before their lordships to show where the right which he asserted in behalf of the queen-consort had been claimed and refused. In every instance, in which it was actually possible for a coronation of a queen to take place, he had shown that it had been solemnized. There was not a single case which, _quoad_ that case, cast a doubt upon the uniform force of his proposition, except that of Henrietta Maria, wife of Charles the First; and he reminded their lordships, it was merely a doubt so far as that particular case went. He had a right then to assume the larger proposition, that all queens-consort of England had, in point of fact, been crowned. Nothing was clearer in the rules of equity and law, than that non-uses did not forfeit, unless where they clearly, from the length of the lapse, involved a waiver of the claim. Where a right had been disputed, and the opposition assented to by the party tacitly, or confirmed by a competent authority, then, of course, there was an end to the legal exercise of such a right. But here the very reverse was the fact. Suppose he were called upon to prove a right of way or a right of common, (the two instances in which the courts of law were most commonly called upon to consider the length of usage,) the principle of law would go with the uniformity, and the absence of exercising the right in one or two particular instances would prove nothing. There were three modes of calling into question the fact of usage; _first_, as to its uniform enjoyment; _next_, where the right claimed by the party had been contested, but nevertheless enjoyed by the person exercising it; and the _third_ case was, where the right asserted had been confiscated, and an adjudication passed upon it: that was of course held to be conclusive against the party, where the right claimed was refused, opposed, and not