38. "Let us see, further, what common right there appertains to men in those things which have already become the property of individuals. Some persons, perchance, may consider it strange to question this, as proprietorship seems to have absorbed all that right which arose out of a state of things in common. But it is not so. For, it is to be considered, _what was the intention of those who first introduced private property_, which we may suppose to have been such, as to deviate as little as possible from _natural equity_. For if even _written laws_ are to be construed in that sense, as far as it is practicable, much more so are _customs_, which are not fettered by the chains of writers.--Hence it follows, first, that, in case of _extreme necessity_, the _pristine right of using things revives_, as much as if they had remained in common; because, in all human laws, as well as in the law of private property, _this case of extreme necessity appears to have been excepted_.--So, if the means of sustenance, as in case of a sea-voyage, should chance to fail, that which any individual may have, should be shared in common. And thus, a fire having broken out, I am justified in destroying the house of my neighbour, in order to preserve my own house; and I may cut in two the ropes or cords amongst which any ship is driven, if it cannot be otherwise disentangled. All which exceptions are not made in the written law, but are presumed.--For the opinion has been acknowledged amongst Divines, that, if any one, in such case of necessity, take from another person what is requisite for the preservation of his life, _he does not commit a theft_. The meaning of which definition is not, as many contend, that the proprietor of the thing be bound to give to the needy upon the principle of _charity_; but, that all things distinctly vested in proprietors ought to be regarded as such _with a certain benign acknowledgment of the primitive right_. For if the original distributors of things were questioned, as to what they thought about this matter, they would reply what I have said. _Necessity_, says Father SENECA, _the great excuse for human weakness, breaks every law_; that is to say, _human law_, or law made after the manner of man." 39. "But cautions ought to be had, for fear this license should be abused: of which the principal is, to try, in every way, whether the necessity can be avoided by any other means; for instance, by making application to the magistrate, or even by trying whether the use of the thing can, by entreaties, be obtained from the proprietor. PLATO permits water to be fetched from the well of a neighbour upon this condition alone, that the person asking for such permission shall dig in his own well in search of water as far as the chalk: and SOLON, that he shall dig in his own well as far as forty cubits. Upon which PLUTARCH adds, _that he judged that necessity was to be relieved, not laziness to be encouraged_."