Crime -- United States; Criminal justice, Administration of -- United States; Criminals -- United States
An equally ambiguous term is the word "wrong." The judges made no
attempt to define it in 1843, and it has been variously interpreted ever
since. Now it may mean "contrary to the dictates of conscience" or, as
it is usually construed, "contrary to the law of the land"--and exactly
what it means may make a great difference to the accused on trial. If
the defendant thinks that God has directed him to kill a wicked man, he
may know that such an act will not only be contrary to law, but also in
opposition to the moral sense of the community as a whole, and yet he
may believe that it is his conscientious duty to take life. In the case
of Hadfield, who deliberately fired at George III in order to be hung,
the defendant believed himself to be the Lord Jesus Christ, and that
only by so doing could the world be saved. Applying the legal test and
translating the word "wrong" as contrary to the common morality of the
community wherein he resided or contrary to law, Hadfield ought to have
achieved his object and been given death upon the scaffold instead of
being clapped, as he was, into a lunatic asylum.
On the other hand, if the word "wrong" is judicially interpreted, it
would seem to be given an elasticity which would invite inevitable
confusion as well as abuse.
Moreover, the test in question takes no cognizance of persons who have
no power of control. The law of New York and most of the states does not
recognize "irresistible impulses," but it should admit the medical fact
that there are persons who, through no fault of their own, are born
practically without any inhibitory capacity whatever, and that there are
others whose control has been so weakened, through accident or disease,
as to render them morally irresponsible,--the so-called psychopathic
inferiors.
Most of us are only too familiar with the state of a person just
falling under the influence of an anesthetic, when all the senses seem
supernaturally acute, the reasoning powers are active and unimpaired,
and the patient is convinced that he can do as he wills, whereas, in
reality, he says and does things which later on seem impossible in their
absurdity. Such a condition is equally possible to the victim of mental
disease, where the knowledge of right and wrong has no real relevancy.
The test of irresponsibility as defined by law is hopelessly inadequate,
judged by present medical knowledge. There is no longer any pretence
that a perception of the nature and quality of an act or that it is
wrong or right is conclusive of the actual insanity of a particular
accused. In a recent murder case a distinguished alienist, testifying
for the prosecution, admitted that over seventy per cent. of the
patients under his treatment, all of whom he regarded as insane and
irresponsible, knew what they were doing and could distinguish right
from wrong.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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