Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic AttitudeDewey, John
Philosophy
Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude
Dewey, John
Philosophy; Pragmatism
There were two fields of ancient science, those of mathematics and of
astronomy, within which very considerable advance was achieved, a fact
which would seem therefore to offer exception to the statement just
made. The theory of the growth of mathematics is a disputed territory,
but whether mathematical discovery and invention take place by steps
which can be identified with those which mark the advance in the
experimental sciences or not, the individual processes in which the
discoveries and inventions have arisen are almost uniformly lost to view
in the demonstration which presents the results. It would be improper to
state that no new data have arisen in the development of mathematics, in
the face of such innovations as the minus quantity, the irrational, the
imaginary, the infinitesimal, or the transfinite number, and yet the
innovations appear as the recasting of the mathematical theories rather
than as new facts. It is of course true that these advances have
depended upon problems such as those which in the researches of Kepler
and Galileo led to the early concepts of the infinitesimal procedure,
and upon such undertakings as bringing the combined theories of geometry
and algebra to bear upon the experiences of continuous change. For a
century after the formulation of the infinitesimal method men were
occupied in carrying the new tool of analysis into every field where its
use promised advance. The conceptions of the method were uncritical. Its
applications were the center of attention. The next century undertook to
bring order into the concepts, consistency into the doctrine, and rigor
into the reasoning. The dominating trend of this movement was logical
rather than methodological. The development was in the interest of the
foundations of mathematics rather than in the use of mathematics as a
method for solving scientific problems. Of course this has in no way
interfered with the freedom of application of mathematical technique to
the problems of physical science. On the contrary, it was on account of
the richness and variety of the contents which the use of mathematical
methods in the physical sciences imported into the doctrine that this
logical housecleaning became necessary in mathematics. The movement has
been not only logical as distinguished from methodological but logical
as distinguished from metaphysical as well. It has abandoned a Euclidean
space with its axioms as a metaphysical presupposition, and it has
abandoned an Aristotelian subsumptive logic for which definition is a
necessary presupposition. It recognizes that everything cannot be
proved, but it does not undertake to state what the axiomata shall be;
and it also recognizes that not everything can be defined, and does not
undertake to determine what shall be defined implicitly and what
explicitly. Its constants are logical constants, as the proposition, the
class and the relation. With these and their like and with relatively
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