[19] Cf. Stuart on "Valuation as a Logical Process" in _Studies in Logical Theory_. [20] _The New Realism_, pp. 40-41. [21] Cf. Montague, pp. 256-57; also Russell, _The Problems of_ _Philosophy_, pp. 27-65-66, _et passim_; and Holt's _Concept of Consciousness_, pp. 14ff., discussed below. [22] Cf. Angell, "Relations of Psychology to Philosophy," _Decennial Publications of University of Chicago_, Vol. III; also Castro, "The Respective Standpoints of Psychology and Logic," _Philosophic Studies, University of Chicago_, No. 4. [23] I am here following, in the main, Professor Holt because he alone appears to have had the courage to develop the full consequences of the premises of analytic logic. [24] _The Concept of Consciousness_, pp. 14-15. [25] It is interesting to compare this onlooking act with the account of consciousness further on. As "psychological" this act of onlooking must be an act of consciousness. But consciousness is a cross-section or a projection of things made by their interaction with a nervous system. Here consciousness is a function of all the interacting factors. It is in the play. It _is_ the play. It is not in a spectator's box. How can consciousness be a function of all the things put into the cross-section and yet be a mere beholder of the process? Moreover, what is it that makes any particular, spectacle, or cross-section "logical"? If it be said all are "logical" what significance has the term? [26] Cf. Russell's _Scientific Methods in Philosophy_, p. 59. [27] Holt, _op. cit._, pp. 128-30. [28] In fact, Newton, in all probability, had the Cartesian pure notions in mind. [29] Holt, _op. cit._, p. 118 (italics mine). Cf. also Perry's _Present Philosophical Tendencies_, pp. 108 and 311. [30] The character of elements and the nature of simplicity have been discussed in the preceding section. [31] _Ibid._, p. 275. [32] _Ibid._, p. 275. [33] This lack of continuity between the cognitive function of the nervous system and its other functions accounts for the strange paradox in the logic of neo-realism of an act of knowing which is "subjective" and yet is the act of so palpably an objective affair as a nervous system. The explanation is that the essence of all deprecated subjectivity is, as before pointed out, functional isolation. That this sort of subjectivity should be identified with the "psychical" is not strange, since a living organism is very difficult to isolate, while the term "psychical," in its metaphysical sense, seems to stand for little else than just this complete isolation. Having once appealed to the nervous system it seems incredible that the physiological continuity of its functions with each other and with its environment should not have suggested the logical corollary. Only the force of the prepossession of mathematical atomism in analytic logic can account for its failure to do so.