In regard to the possession of stolen goods, such a sentence may have
similar significance. I recall a case in which several people were
sentenced for the theft of a so-called fokos (a Hungarian cane with a
head like an ax). Later a fokos was used in murder in the same region
and the first suspicion of the crime was attached to the thief, who
might, because of his early crime, have been in possession of a fokos.
Now suppose that the man had confessed to theft of everything but the
fokos, and that he had been condemned on the basis of the confession,
the fact would be of far-reaching significance in the present case. Of
course it is not intended that the old case is to be tried again before
the new. That would be a difficult job after the lapse of some time, and
in addition, would be of little use, for everybody recalls the old
judgment anyway and supposes that the circumstances must have been such
as to show the man guilty. If a man is once sentenced for something he
has not confessed to, the stigma remains no matter how the facts may be
against it.
Experience has shown that the victims of theft count everything stolen
that they do not discover at the first glance. And it might have been
lost long before the theft, or have been stolen at an earlier or a later
time. For this reason it often happens that servants, and even the
children of the house or other frequenters, take the robbery as an
opportunity for explaining the disappearance of things they are
responsible for or steal afresh and blame it upon “the thief.” The
quantity stolen is generally exaggerated, moreover, in order to excite
universal sympathy and perhaps to invoke help. In general, we must hold
that there is no psychological reason that a confessor should deny
anything the confession of which can bring him no additional harm. The
last point must be carefully treated, for it requires taking the
attitude of the accused and not of the examiner. It is the former’s
information and view-point that must be studied, and it often contains
the most perverted view-points; e.g., one man denies out of mere
obstinacy because he believes that his guilt is increased by this or
that fact. The proposition: who has stolen one thing, has also stolen
the rest, has slight justification.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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