I learned from an especially significant case, how the same thing could
happen with regard to vision. A child was run over and killed by a
careless coachman. A pensioned officer saw this through the window. His
description was quite characteristic. It was the anniversary of a
certain battle. The old gentleman, who stood by the window thinking
about it and about his long dead comrades, was looking blankly out into
the street. The horrible cry of the unhappy child woke him up and he
really began to see. Then he observed that he had in truth seen
everything that had happened _before_ the child was knocked over--i.e.,
for some reason the coachman had turned around, turning the horses in
such a way at the same time that the latter jumped sidewise upon the
frightened child, and hence the accident. The general expressed himself
correctly in this fashion: “I saw it all, but I did not perceive and
know that I saw it until _after_ the scream of the child.” He offered
also in proof of the correctness of his testimony, that he, an old
cavalry officer, would have had to see the approaching misfortune if he
had consciously seen the moving of the coachman, and then he would have
had to be frightened. But he knew definitely that he was frightened only
when the child cried out--he could not, therefore, have consciously
perceived the preceding event. His story was confirmed by other
witnesses.
This psychological process is of significance in criminal trials,
inasmuch as many actionable cases depend upon sudden and unexpected
events, where retrospective illumination may frequently come in. In such
cases it is most important to determine what actually has been
perceived, and it is never indifferent whether we take the testimony in
question as true or not.
With regard to the senses of criminals, Lombroso and Ottolenghi have
asserted that they are duller than those of ordinary people. The
assertion is based on a collection made by Lombroso of instances of the
great indifference of criminals to pain. But he has overlooked the fact
that the reason is quite another thing. Barbarous living and barbarous
morals are especially dulling, so that indifference to pain is a
characteristic of all barbarous nations and characters. Inasmuch as
there are many criminals among barbarous people, barbarity, criminality
and indifference to pain come together in a large number of cases. But
there is nothing remarkable in this, and a direct relation between crime
and dullness of the senses can not be demonstrated.
(b) The Sense of Sight.
Section 37. (1) _General Considerations._
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