the brain determines the scope of the function of association.” How
convincing this definition is becomes clear on considering the processes
in question. Let us think of some person accused of a crime to whom the
ground of accusation is presented for the first time, and to whom the
judge after that presents the skilfully constructed proof of his guilt
by means of individual bits of evidence. Now think of the mass of
thoughts here excited, even if the accused is innocent. The deed itself
is foreign to him, he must imagine that; should any relation to it (e.g.
presence at the place where the deed was done, interest in it, ownership
of the object, etc.) be present to his mind, he must become clear
concerning this relationship, while at the same time the possibilities
of excuse--alibi, ownership of the thing, etc.--storm upon him. Then
only does he consider the particular reasons of suspicion which he must,
in some degree, incarnate and represent in their dangerous character,
and for each of which he must find a separate excuse. We have here some
several dozens of thought-series, which start their movement at the same
time and through each other. If at that time an especially dangerous
apparent proof is brought, and if the accused, recognizing this danger,
blushes with fear, the examiner thinks: “Now I have caught the rascal,
for he’s blushing! Now let’s go ahead quickly, speed the examination and
enter the confused answer in the protocol!” And who believes the accused
when, later on, he withdraws the “confession” and asserts that he had
said the thing because they had mixed him up?
In this notion, “you blush, therefore you have lied; you did it!” lie
many sins the commission of which is begun at the time of admonishing
little children and ended with obtaining the “confessions” of the
murderous thief.
Finally, it is not to be forgotten that there are cases of blushing
which have nothing to do with psychical processes. Ludwig Meyer[81]
calls it “artificial blushing” (better, “mechanically developed
blushing”), and narrates the case of “easily-irritated women who could
develop a blush with the least touch of friction, e.g., of the face on a
pillow, rubbing with the hand, etc.; and this blush could not be
distinguished from the ordinary blush.” We may easily consider that such
lightly irritable women may be accused, come before the court without
being recognized as such, and, for example, cover their faces with their
hands and blush. Then the thing might be called “evidential.”
Section 12. (b) General Signs of Character.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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