Critical, Historical, and Miscellaneous Essays; Vol. 2: With a Memoir and IndexMacaulay, Thomas Babington Macaulay, Baron
Philosophy
Critical, Historical, and Miscellaneous Essays; Vol. 2: With a Memoir and Index
Macaulay, Thomas Babington Macaulay, Baron
English literature -- History and criticism; Great Britain -- History
Wherever a king or an oligarchy refrains from the last extremity of
rapacity and tyranny through fear of the resistance of the people,
there the constitution, whatever it may be called, is in some measure
democratical.
The admixture of democratic power may be slight. It may be much slighter
than it ought to be; but some admixture there is. Wherever a numerical
minority, by means of superior wealth or intelligence, of political
concert, or of military discipline, exercises a greater influence on
the society than any other equal number of persons,--there, whatever the
form of government may be called, a mixture of aristocracy does in fact
exist. And, wherever a single man, from whatever cause, is so necessary
to the community, or to any portion of it, that he possesses more
power than any other man, there is a mixture of monarchy. This is
the philosophical classification of governments: and if we use this
classification we shall find, not only that {108}there are mixed
governments, but that all governments are, and must always be, mixed.
But we may safely challenge Mr. Mill to give any definition of power, or
to make any classification of governments, which shall bear him ont in
his assertion that a lasting division of authority is impracticable.
It is evidently on the real distribution of power, and not on names and
badges, that the happiness of nations must depend. The representative
system, though doubtless a great and precious discovery in politics, is
only one of the many modes in which the democratic part of the community
can efficiently check the governing few. That certain men have been
chosen as deputies of the people,--that there is a piece of paper
stating such deputies to possess certain powers,--these circumstances
in themselves constitute no security for good government. Such a
constitution nominally existed in France; while, in fact, an oligarchy
of committees and clubs trampled at once on the electors and the
elected. Representation is a very happy contrivance for enabling large
bodies of men to exert their power with less risk of disorder than there
would otherwise be. But, assuredly, it does not of itself give power.
Unless a representative assembly is sure of being supported in the
last resort by the physical strength of large masses who have spirit
to defend the constitution and sense to defend it in concert, the mob of
the town in which it meets may overawe it;--the howls of the listeners
in its gallery may silence its deliberations;--an able and daring
individual may dissolve it. And, if that sense and that spirit of
which we speak be diffused through a society, then, even without a
representative assembly, that society will enjoy many of the blessings
of good government. {109}Which is the better able to defend himself as a
strong man with nothing but his fists, or a paralytic cripple encumbered
with a sword which he cannot lift? Such, we believe, is the difference
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