The memorandum was written by Prince Lichnowsky about eighteen months ago for the purpose of explaining and justifying his position to his personal friends, and only half a dozen typewritten copies were made. One of these copies, through a betrayal, reached the Wilhelmstrasse, and caused a great scandal, and another was communicated to some members of the Minority Socialist Party. But how it happened that a copy got across the German frontier remains a mystery. Internal evidence, however, leaves no doubt in regard to the authenticity of the document. It is entitled "My London Mission, 1912-1914," and is dated "Kuchelna, (Prince Lichnowsky's country seat,) August, 1916." Prince Lichnowsky begins with a recital of the circumstances which led to his being appointed to London after many years of retirement from diplomacy, and a description of the European position as he then found it. The moment, he believes, was undoubtedly favorable for a new attempt to get on a better footing with England. Our enigmatical Moroccan policy had repeatedly shaken confidence in our peaceful disposition and aroused the suspicion that we were not quite sure what we wanted, or that our intention was to keep Europe in suspense, and, when occasion served, to humiliate the French. An Austrian colleague, who was long in Paris, said to me, "If the French begin to forget révanche, you regularly remind them of it by treading heavily on their toes." After rejecting M. Delcassé's attempt to come to an agreement with us in regard to Morocco, and declaring that we had no political interests there, an attitude which was in full accordance with the traditions of the Bismarckian policy, we suddenly recognized in Abdul Aziz a Kruger No. 2. To him, also, like the Boers, we promised the powerful support of the German Empire--at the same cost and with the same result. For both affairs ended, as they had to end, unless we were already then resolved to undertake a world war--namely, in withdrawal. Our attitude promoted the Russo-Japanese and the Russo-British rapprochements. In face of the German peril all other conflicts fell into the background. The possibility of a new Franco-German war had become evident. THE BRITISH PROGRAM After describing the futility of Germany's Moroccan policy, Prince Lichnowsky goes on: