Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, May 1918: Vol. VIII, Part I, No. 2Various
History
Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, May 1918: Vol. VIII, Part I, No. 2
Various
World War, 1914-1918
So Grey on July 29 resolved upon his well-known warning. I
replied I had always reported that we should have to reckon upon
English hostility if it came to war with France. The Minister
said to me repeatedly, "If war breaks out it will be the
greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen." After that events
moved rapidly.
When Count Berchtold, who hitherto had played strong man on
instructions from Berlin, at last decided to change his course,
we answered Russian mobilization--after Russia had waited and
negotiated in vain for a whole week--with our ultimatum and
declaration of war.
Up to the last moment I had hoped for a waiting attitude on the
part of England. As late as August the King of England replied
evasively to the French President, but in a telegram from
Berlin, which announced the threatening danger of war, England
already was mentioned as an opponent. In Berlin, therefore, one
already reckoned upon war with England.
Before my departure Sir Edward Grey received me on Aug. 5 at his
house. I went there at his desire. He was deeply moved. He said
to me that he would always be ready to mediate, and "We do not
want to crush Germany." Unfortunately this confidential
conversation was published, and thereby von Bethmann Hollweg
destroyed the last possibility of reaching a peace via England.
Questions of Guilt
As it appears from all official publications without the facts
being controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its
poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation:
1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no
German interest was involved and the danger of a world war must
have been known to us; whether we knew the text of the ultimatum
is a question of complete indifference.
2. In the days between July 23 and 30, 1914, when Sazonoff
emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate an attack
on Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation,
although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had
accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement
about the two points in question could easily have been reached
and Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian
reply.
3. On July 30, when Berchtold wanted to give way, we, without
Austria having been attacked, replied to Russia's mere
mobilization by sending an ultimatum to St. Petersburg, and on
July 31 we declared war on the Russians, although the Czar had
pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a
man should march--so that we deliberately destroyed the
possibility of a peaceful settlement.
[Illustration: PRINCE LICHNOWSKY]
In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that
the whole world outside of Germany attributes to us sole guilt
for the world war.
THE BAGDAD RAILWAY
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