Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, May 1918: Vol. VIII, Part I, No. 2Various
History
Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, May 1918: Vol. VIII, Part I, No. 2
Various
World War, 1914-1918
Eventually I decided that, despite the various limiting factors, I could
muster enough force to make a first success sufficiently sure to justify
undertaking the attack, but that the degree to which this success could
be followed up must depend on circumstances.
It was calculated that, provided secrecy could be maintained to the last
moment, no large hostile reinforcements were likely to reach the scene
of action for forty-eight hours after the commencement of the attack. I
informed General the Hon. Sir Julian Byng, K. C. B., K. C. M. G., M. V.
O., to whom the execution of the plans in connection with the Cambrai
operations was intrusted, that the advance would be stopped by me after
that time, or sooner if necessary, unless the results then gained and
the general situation justified its continuance.
Plan of Attack
The general plan of attack was to dispense with previous artillery
preparation, and to depend instead on tanks to smash through the enemy's
wire, of which there was a great quantity protecting his trenches.
As soon as the advance of the tanks and infantry, working in close
co-operation, began, the artillery was to assist with counter battery
and barrage work; but no previous registration of guns for this purpose
could be permitted, as it would rouse the enemy's suspicions. The
artillery of our new armies was therefore necessarily subjected to a
severe test in this operation, and proved itself entirely worthy of the
confidence placed in it.
The infantry, tanks, and artillery thus working in combination were to
endeavor to break through all the enemy's lines of defense on the first
day. If this were successfully accomplished and the situation developed
favorably, cavalry were then to be passed through to raid the enemy's
communications, disorganize his system of command, damage his railways,
and interfere as much as possible with the arrival of his
reinforcements. It was explained to all commanders that everything
depended on secrecy up to the moment of starting, and after that on
bold, determined, and rapid action. Unless opposition could be beaten
down quickly, no great results could be looked for.
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