The memorandum was submitted to the Imperial Chancellor, who passed it on to Dr. Helfferich, the Secretary of State for Finance. He, however, rejected the document on the ground that, in the absence of authentic estimates of stocks, it was impossible to set a time-limit to England's staying power, and also that he was exceedingly doubtful as to what line would be taken by neutrals, especially the United States. Dr. Helfferich maintained that so desperate a remedy should only be employed as a last resource. The authors of the memorandum then sent a reply, in which they developed their former arguments, and pointed to the gravity of the internal situation in Germany. They emphasized the importance of using the nearest and sharpest weapons of offense if a national collapse was to be avoided. They reinforced their argument by adducing the evidence of ten experts, representing finance, commerce, the mining industry, and agriculture. They were Herr Waldemar Müller, the President of the Dresdner Bank; Dr. Salomonsohn of the Disconto Gesellschaft; Dr. Paul Reusch of Oberhausen, Royal Prussian Councilor of Commerce; Dr. Springorum of Dortmund, Chancellor of Commerce, member of the Prussian Upper House, (Herren Haus,) General Director of Railways and Tramways at Hoesch, an ironmaster, and a great expert in railways; Herr Max Schinkel of Hamburg, President of the Norddeutsche Bank in Hamburg and of the Disconto Gesellschaft in Berlin; Herr Zuckschwerdt of Madgeburg, Councilor of Commerce, late member of the Prussian Upper House; Herr Wilhelm von Finck of Munich, Privy Councilor, chief of the banking house of Merck, Finck & Co., Munich; Councilor of Economics R. Schmidt of Platzhof, member of the Württemberg Upper Chamber and of the German Agricultural Council; Herr Engelhard of Mannheim, Councilor of Commerce, President of the Chamber of Commerce and member of the Baden Upper Chamber. These experts were invited to send answers in writing to the three following questions: (1) What would be the effect on England of unrestricted submarine warfare? (2) What would be its effect on Germany's relations with the United States and other neutrals? (3) To what extent does the internal situation in Germany demand the use of this drastic weapon?