"Russia was by no means obliged 'to give way to us all along the line'; on the contrary, she 'advanced the wishes of Serbia' in several ways, Serbia even receiving some cities and strips of territory that could have been regarded as purely Albanian or preponderatingly so. Prince Lichnowsky says that 'the course of the conference was a fresh humiliation for the self-consciousness of Russia' and that there was a feeling of resentment in Russia on that account. It cannot be the task of our policy to satisfy all the unjustified demands of the exaggerated self-consciousness of a power by no means friendly to us, at the cost of our ally. Russia has no vital interests on the Adriatic, but our ally certainly has. If we, as Prince Lichnowsky seems to wish, had flatly taken the same stand as Russia, the result would have been a humiliation for Austria-Hungary and thus a weakening of our group. Prince Lichnowsky seems only anxious that Russia be not humiliated; a humiliation of Austria is apparently a matter of indifference to him. The "Wily" Venizelos "When Prince Lichnowsky says that our 'Austrophilie' was not adapted to 'promote Russia's interests in Asia,' I don't exactly understand what this means. Following a disastrous diversion toward East Asia--in the Japanese war we had favored Russia without even being thanked for it!--Russia again took up her policy directed toward the European Orient (the Balkans and Constantinople) with renewed impulse, (the Balkan Alliance, Buchlau, Iswolsky, &c.) [Iswolsky retired as Russian Foreign Minister after Germany forced the Czar to repudiate his Serbian policy in 1909.] "Venizelos, the cunning Cretan with the 'Ribbon of the Order of the Red Eagle,' evidently knew how to throw a little sand into the eyes of our Ambassador. He, in contrast to King Constantine and Theototy, always was pro-Entente. His present attitude reveals his feelings as clearly as can be. Herr Danef, however, was entirely inclined toward Petrograd.