"Objectively taken, the statement of Prince Lichnowsky presents such an abundance of inaccuracies and distortions that it is hardly a wonder that his conclusions are also entirely wrong. The reproach that we sent an ultimatum on July 30 to Petrograd merely because of the mobilization of Russia and on July 31 declared war upon the Russians, although the Czar had pledged his word that not a man should march so long as negotiations were under way, thus willfully destroying the possibility of a peaceful adjustment, has really a grotesque effect. In concluding, the statement seems almost to identify itself with the standpoint of our enemies. "When the Ambassador makes the accusation that our policy identified itself 'with Turks and Austro-Magyars' and 'subjected itself to the viewpoints of Vienna and Budapest,' he may be suitably answered that he saw things only through London spectacles and from the narrow point of view of his desired rapprochement with England à tout prix. He also appears to have forgotten completely that the Entente was formed much more against us than against Austria. "I, too, pursued a policy which aimed at an understanding with England, because I was of the opinion that this was the only way for us to escape from the unfavorable position in which we were placed by the unequal division of strength and the weakness of the Triple Alliance. But Russia and France insisted upon war. We were obligated through our treaty with Austria, and our position as a great power was also threatened--hic Rhodus, hic salta. But England, that was not allied in the same way with Russia and that had received far-reaching assurances from us regarding the sparing of France and Belgium, seized the sword. "In saying this, I by no means share the opinion prevalent among us today that England laid all the mines for the outbreak of the war; on the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his earnest wish to arrive at an agreement with us. But he had allowed himself to become entangled too far in the net of the Franco-Russian policy; he no longer found the way out, and he did not prevent the world war--something that he could have done. Neither was the war popular with the English people; Belgium had to serve as a battle cry. "'Political marriages for life and death' are, as Prince Lichnowsky says, not possible in international unions. But neither is isolation, under the present condition of affairs in Europe. The history of Europe consists of coalitions that sometimes have led to the avoidance of warlike outbreaks and sometimes to violent clashes. A loosening and dissolving of old alliances that no longer correspond to all conditions is only in order when new constellations are attainable. This was the object of the policy of a rapprochement with England. So long as this policy did not offer reliable guarantees we could not abandon the old guarantees--even with their obligations.