The Young Turkish revolution of 1908, which at first seemed destined greatly to minimize German power at Constantinople, really resulted in an opposite effect. Thus in spite of the effective support of England for Turkey during the Bosnian and Bulgarian crises of 1908 and 1909, a gradual reaction subsequently set in. This was due in part to the cleverness and regardlessness of von Bieberstein, and in part to the circumstances arising out of the policy adopted by the Young Turks. For instance, while the Germans ignored the necessity for reforms in the Ottoman Empire so long as the Turks favored a Teutonic program, it was impossible for the British Government or the British public to look with favor upon a régime which worked to maintain the privileged position of Moslems throughout the empire, which did nothing to punish those who instigated the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia in 1909, and which was intent upon disturbing the status quo in the Persian Gulf, and upon changing the status of Egypt to the Turkish advantage. The Turco-German Entente Such indeed became the position that even the Turco-Italian war, which might have been expected to shake the confidence of the Ottoman Government in the bona fides of Italy's then ally, did not seriously disturb the intimate relations which were gradually developing between Berlin and Constantinople. Here again enemy intrigues were to the fore, for in addition to Austria's objecting to the inauguration of any Italian operations in the Balkans, the German Government, when the position of its representative in Constantinople had become seriously compromised as a result of the Italian annexation of Tripoli, which he could not prevent, suddenly found it convenient to transfer von Bieberstein to London and to replace him by another, perhaps less able, but certainly none the less successful in retaining a grasp over everything which took place in the Ottoman capital.