"De Bello Gallico" and Other CommentariesCaesar, Julius
History
"De Bello Gallico" and Other Commentaries
Caesar, Julius
Gaul -- History -- Gallic Wars, 58-51 B.C.; Rome -- History -- Civil War, 49-48 B.C.
XVI.--Though Caesar could not perceive the retreat of the enemy for the
intervention of the fire, yet, suspecting that they had adopted that
method to favour their escape, he made his legions advance, and sent a
party of horse to pursue them; but, apprehensive of an ambuscade, and
that the enemy might remain in the same place and endeavour to draw our
men into a disadvantageous situation, he advances himself but slowly.
The horse, being afraid to venture into the smoke and dense line of
flame, and those who were bold enough to attempt it being scarcely able
to see their horses' heads, gave the enemy free liberty to retreat,
through fear of an ambuscade. Thus, by a flight, full at once of
cowardice and address, they advanced without any loss about ten miles,
and encamped in a very strong position. From which, laying numerous
ambuscades, both of horse and foot, they did considerable damage to the
Roman foragers.
XVII.--After this had happened several times, Caesar discovered, from a
certain prisoner, that Correus, the general of the Bellovaci, had
selected six thousand of his bravest foot and a thousand horse, with
which he designed to lie in ambush in a place to which he suspected the
Romans would send to look for forage, on account of the abundance of
corn and grass. Upon receiving information of their design Caesar drew
out more legions than he usually did, and sent forward his cavalry as
usual, to protect the foragers. With these he intermixed a guard of
light infantry, and himself advanced with the legions as fast as he
could.
XVIII.--The Gauls, placed in ambush, had chosen for the seat of action a
level piece of bound, not more than a mile in extent, enclosed on every
side by a thick wood or a very deep river, as by a toil, and this they
surrounded. Our men, apprised of the enemy's design, marched in good
order to the ground, ready both in heart and hand to give battle, and
willing to hazard any engagement when the legions were at their back. On
their approach, as Correus supposed that he had got an opportunity of
effecting his purpose, he at first shows himself with a small party and
attacks the foremost troops. Our men resolutely stood the charge, and
did not crowd together in one place, as commonly happens from surprise
in engagements between the horse, whose numbers prove injurious to
themselves.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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