*36* Erat igitur ex iis[195] tribus, quae ad gloriam pertinerent, hoc tertium, ut cum admiratione hominum honore ab iis[196] digni iudicaremur. Admirantur igitur communiter illi quidem omnia, quae magna et praeter opinionem suam animadverterunt, separatim autem, in singulis si perspiciunt necopinata quaedam bona. Itaque eos viros suspiciunt maximisque efferunt laudibus, in quibus existimant se excellentes quasdam et singulares perspicere virtutes, despiciunt autem eos et contemnunt, in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi, nihil nervorum putant. Non enim omnes eos contemnunt, de quibus male existimant. Nam quos improbos, maledicos, fraudulentos putant et ad faciendam iniuriam instructos, eos haud contemnunt quidem,[197] sed de iis[198] male existimant. Quam ob rem, ut ante dixi, contemnuntur ii,[199] qui "nec sibi nec alteri," ut dicitur, in quibus nullus labor, nulla industria, nulla cura est. *37* Admiratione autem afficiuntur ii, qui anteire ceteris virtute putantur et cum omni carere dedecore, tum vero iis vitiis, quibus alii non facile possunt obsistere. Nam et voluptates, blandissimae dominae, maioris partis animos[200] a virtute detorquent et, dolorum cum admoventur faces, praeter modum plerique exterrentur; vita mors, divitiae paupertas omnes homines vehementissime permovent. Quae qui in utramque partem excelso animo magnoque despiciunt, cumque aliqua iis ampla et honesta res obiecta est, totos ad se convertit et rapit, tum quis non admiretur splendorem pulchritudinemque virtutis? [194] _loquimur_ B; _loquamur_ H a b; _loquemur_ c. [195] _iis_ Bt.; _his_ B H; _hijs_ c; not in a b. [196] _iis_ Bt.; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c. [197] _haud contemnunt quidem_ b, Bt.^2; _contemnunt quidem nautiquam_ B H a p, Bt.^1, Heine; _contemnunt quidem nequaquam_ c; _non contemnunt quidem_ Madvig, Müller. [198] _iis_ B, Edd.; _his_ H a b; _hijs_ c. [199] _ii_ B b; _hii_ H; _hi_ a; _hij_, c. So § 37. [200] _maioris partis animos_ c, Edd.; _maiores partis animi_ B; _maiores partes animi_ H a b. *35* X. But I am afraid some one may wonder why I am now separating the virtues--as if it were possible for anyone to be just who is not at the same time wise; for it is agreed upon among all philosophers, and I myself have often argued, that he who has one virtue has them all. The explanation of my apparent inconsistency is that the precision of speech we employ, when abstract truth is critically investigated in philosophic discussion, is one thing; and that employed, when we are adapting our language entirely to popular thinking, is another. And therefore I am speaking here in the popular sense, when I call some men brave, others good, and still others wise; for in dealing with popular conceptions we must employ familiar words in their common acceptation; and this was the practice of Panaetius likewise. But let us return to the subject. #(3) through esteem and admiration.#