Battles -- United States; United States -- History, Military -- To 1900
As the broken and diminished multitude fell back to Seminary Ridge,
Lee rode out to meet them. He was alone, his staff being all absent,
in that supreme moment, on desperate errands. His face was calm and
resolute, his voice confident but sympathetic as he exclaimed, “It
was all my fault; now help me to do what I can to save what is left.”
It casts a light on his character that even in that hour he chided a
young officer near for chastising his horse: “Don’t whip him, captain.
I’ve got just such another foolish horse myself, and whipping does no
good.”[266] Longstreet declares Lee said again that night, about the
bivouac-fire: “It was all my fault. You ought not to have made that
last attack”; and that still again Lee wrote to him at a later time,
“If I had only taken your advice, even on the 3d, and moved around the
Federal left, how different all might have been!”[267]
Longstreet also records that he fully expected a counter-stroke
at once, and looked to his batteries, only to find the ammunition
exhausted; but they were his only reliance for defence. The Federal
cavalry, at that moment attacking his right, occupied troops who might
otherwise have been brought to the centre.
Should there have been a counter-stroke? Hancock, lying wounded almost
to death in an ambulance, reasoned that, because he had been struck by
a tenpenny nail, the Confederate ammunition must be exhausted; he had
strength to dictate an approval if the charge should be ordered.[268]
Lincoln always felt that it should have been made, and lamented that
he did not go to Gettysburg himself and push matters on the field, as
the crisis required.[269] We can surmise what Grant would have done had
he instead of Meade, as the sun lowered, looked across the valley from
Cemetery Ridge. But the case may be put strongly for Meade: with his
best lieutenants dead or wounded, worn out himself, whom else could he
trust? And, in the disorder of his line, how could he tell how far his
own army had been shattered in the desperate fights, or what was Lee’s
condition? It was only prudent to let well enough alone. Nevertheless,
a little of such imprudence as his adversary was constantly showing
might perhaps have led to Lee’s complete destruction.[270] During the
three fearful days the Federals had lost 3155 killed, 14,529 wounded,
5365 missing--a total of about 23,000; the Confederates, 3903 killed,
18,735 wounded, 5425 missing--a total of about 28,000.[271]
As it was, Lee stood defiantly on Seminary Ridge full twenty-four hours
longer. Then, gathering his army about him, and calling in the cavalry
which, during Pickett’s charge, was receiving severe punishment on its
own account at the hands of Gregg and his division, he slowly withdrew.
Practically undisturbed, he crossed the Potomac, followed with great
deliberation by the army that had conquered but failed to crush.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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