It is true that during the long peace the army had become very inert in many respects. Innovations were only tardily adopted. Many tried to extract from the regulations a compromise between what was old and past and what was new and enduring. In this they overlooked the fact that even enduring things will constantly call for improvements. This applies also to the experiences afforded by this World War. They cannot continue indefinitely to be authoritative any more than the experiences of earlier wars, if only because the development of technical science both on the land and in the air can never come to a standstill. Above all, the individual must impress upon himself that a certain partiality must always attach to his own particular experiences. Our troops have exhibited a striking faculty of adapting themselves to circumstances, but the same cannot be said of all their officers; and this prolonged trench warfare in itself has a dangerous tendency to engender a one-sided view. It has also to be remembered that the conditions in the East and the West respectively were entirely different. A certain inertia, however, in the case of such a great organism as is presented by the army, although it may prove a hindrance on occasion, has also its good side. A certain amount of conservatism is indispensable; it helps to secure a continuous progress, and not a progress by leaps and bounds. We have already shown that the fact that a thing is old is by no means necessarily a reason for discarding it; we have been able to point to many phenomena similar to those of the time of Moltke, Napoleon, nay, even of Frederick the Great. Of course these similarities are only evident when we consider the thing as a whole. The tactics of 1870-71 had become out of date long before the World War, and occasional reversions to them, such as occurred with us here and there before the War, will now have to be renounced once and for all. Within certain limits, however, the phenomena of war repeat themselves not infrequently, although the form is always altered, and they have to be duly adapted to present conditions. [1] Vol. vii. _Feldzug_, 1812. [2] _Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik_. V. _Der 18 August, 1870_, p. 407. [3] Stegemann, _loc. cit._, i., 211. [4] _On War_, vol. iii., p. 4. [_Vom Kriege. Skizzen zum VII. B._, 2 Kap.] [5] Pierron, _Méthodes de guerre_, 1. [6] _On War_, vol. iii., p. 155. [_Vom Kriege. Skizzen zum VII. B._, 2 Kap.] [7] _On War_, vol. iii., p. 72. [_Vom Kriege. Skizzen zum VII. B._, 26 Kap.] [8] _Betrachtungen über die Taktik_, etc. [9] Foucart. _Jéna_. [10] _Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze_. Bemerkungen über den Einfluss der verbesserten Feuerwaffen. [11] Dragomirow. _Skizzen des Oesterreichisch-Preussischen Krieges im Jahre 1866_. [12] _Taktische Aufgaben_. [13] Vol. x., _Strategische Beleuchtung mehrerer Feldzüge_. Friedrich der Grosse. V THE ARMY IN THE FUTURE