Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920Crowell, Benedict
History
Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920
Crowell, Benedict
United States. Army. American Expeditionary Forces -- Demobilization; World War, 1914-1918 -- United States
This figure, indeed, is an estimate; but it is a close estimate. It
is an estimate because, at the time this is written (July, 1921), the
liquidation of the war aircraft industry is not yet quite complete.
Four contractors’ claims are still unsettled, and surplus worth less
than $18,000,000 remains unsold. Therefore, even if the estimated
cost of settling the claims and the estimated recovery from the sale
of surplus are grossly inaccurate, such errors cannot greatly affect
the total estimate. The last official financial statement on the war
business of the Air Service, dated April 23, 1921, showed that the net
cost then was $738,133,972.28, leaving in the Treasury at that time an
unexpended balance of $419,936,801.20, and this cost was still to be
reduced by recoveries from the sale of surplus and by reimbursements
of overpayments made to contractors in the settlements.
Thus we have, as the cost of the war air program, the figure
$720,000,000--not half the billion and a half alleged by the critics
to have been wasted. But what happened to the $720,000,000? Was it
wasted? What did we get for it? The answers to these questions may be a
revelation to those who have accepted the common misstatement that the
whole project ended in a colossal failure.
First, airplanes. For the money spent the Army received, not a few
hundred airplanes, but approximately 19,000. When the money was
appropriated, those in charge of the air program, and the public,
too, expected these funds to produce airplanes in numbers sufficient
to darken the skies. Well, here was the sky-darkening cloud of
them--19,000 planes, produced and delivered to the Army. And at least
half this number consisted of “service” planes, as distinguished from
training machines. The average value of an airplane without engine may
be conservatively placed at $6,000. Thus, the planes delivered on the
war orders were worth $114,000,000, a sum which accounts for nearly
one-sixth of the total war expenditure made by the Air Service. In
round numbers, the American industry produced 12,000 of these planes
before the armistice, and afterwards, during the termination of the
work, completed production on 1,500 that were unfinished. The remaining
5,500 were purchased from the French, British, and Italian industries.
Those who criticize the administration of this branch of our war
industry commonly lose sight of the fact that all the foreign airplanes
procured by us were bought with the funds appropriated for the Air
Service.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account