Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920Crowell, Benedict
History
Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920
Crowell, Benedict
United States. Army. American Expeditionary Forces -- Demobilization; World War, 1914-1918 -- United States
Thus, in selling our surplus in France we were limited to a single
customer; and when you can sell your product to only one buyer you
must prepare to accept the buyer’s scale of prices. Of course,
the inhibition upon sales did not apply to sales to other foreign
governments; for in that event the American goods were regarded as
being in France in bond, and it was not incumbent upon the United
States to pay the French import duties upon them. On the other hand,
a physical reason operated against the sale of stores to European
countries outside France--the run-down and almost wrecked condition
of the French railroads. The delivery of locomotives and cars by the
Germans under the armistice terms virtually rehabilitated the rolling
stock of the French railways, but the trackage had deteriorated during
the war, and the incursions of military conscription had left the
operating _personnel_ poor in quality and deficient in quantity. It
was next to impossible to ship anything out of France. During the
early months after the armistice America sold surplus supplies to
various countries of Europe outside France--particularly to Belgium
and the liberated nations of southeastern Europe--to the value of many
millions; but, up to August 1, 1919, it had been able to deliver less
than one-fifth of these supplies.
Another advantage accruing to France as the principal buyer of the
American surplus was that the A. E. F. was making what amounted to a
forced sale. If anything was evident in the attitude of the French
people after the armistice, it was that they earnestly desired to speed
their departing military guests out of France. The American troops
no less ardently wished to go, and it was the policy of the American
Government to repatriate them as rapidly as the shipping could be
provided. The disposal of the supplies was a secondary consideration.
If the Americans had attempted to hold out for favorable markets and
good prices for their surpluses in piecemeal sales, they would have
had to keep from 20,000 to 30,000 troops in France for several years
to guard the unsold stocks. The alternative of hiring civilian guards
was out of the question, from the standpoint of expense alone. There
was nothing else to do except sell out quickly for the best prices
obtainable under the circumstances.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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