Democracy in America — Volume 1Tocqueville, Alexis de
History
Democracy in America — Volume 1
Tocqueville, Alexis de
Democracy -- United States; United States -- Politics and government; United States -- Social conditions
But the difficulty increases when the proceedings are not brought
forward by but against the Union. The Constitution recognizes the
legislative power of the States; and a law so enacted may impair the
privileges of the Union, in which case a collision in unavoidable
between that body and the State which has passed the law: and it only
remains to select the least dangerous remedy, which is very clearly
deducible from the general principles I have before established. *k
k
[ See Chapter VI. on “Judicial Power in America.”]
It may be conceived that, in the case under consideration, the Union
might have used the State before a Federal court, which would have
annulled the act, and by this means it would have adopted a natural
course of proceeding; but the judicial power would have been placed in
open hostility to the State, and it was desirable to avoid this
predicament as much as possible. The Americans hold that it is nearly
impossible that a new law should not impair the interests of some
private individual by its provisions: these private interests are
assumed by the American legislators as the ground of attack against
such measures as may be prejudicial to the Union, and it is to these
cases that the protection of the Supreme Court is extended.
Suppose a State vends a certain portion of its territory to a company,
and that a year afterwards it passes a law by which the territory is
otherwise disposed of, and that clause of the Constitution which
prohibits laws impairing the obligation of contracts violated. When the
purchaser under the second act appears to take possession, the
possessor under the first act brings his action before the tribunals of
the Union, and causes the title of the claimant to be pronounced null
and void. *l Thus, in point of fact, the judicial power of the Union is
contesting the claims of the sovereignty of a State; but it only acts
indirectly and upon a special application of detail: it attacks the law
in its consequences, not in its principle, and it rather weakens than
destroys it.
l
[ See Kent’s “Commentaries,” vol. i. p. 387.]
The last hypothesis that remained was that each State formed a
corporation enjoying a separate existence and distinct civil rights,
and that it could therefore sue or be sued before a tribunal. Thus a
State could bring an action against another State. In this instance the
Union was not called upon to contest a provincial law, but to try a
suit in which a State was a party. This suit was perfectly similar to
any other cause, except that the quality of the parties was different;
and here the danger pointed out at the beginning of this chapter exists
with less chance of being avoided. The inherent disadvantage of the
very essence of Federal constitutions is that they engender parties in
the bosom of the nation which present powerful obstacles to the free
course of justice.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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