Democracy in America — Volume 1Tocqueville, Alexis de
History
Democracy in America — Volume 1
Tocqueville, Alexis de
Democracy -- United States; United States -- Politics and government; United States -- Social conditions
The peace, the prosperity, and the very existence of the Union are
vested in the hands of the seven judges. Without their active
co-operation the Constitution would be a dead letter: the Executive
appeals to them for assistance against the encroachments of the
legislative powers; the Legislature demands their protection from the
designs of the Executive; they defend the Union from the disobedience
of the States, the States from the exaggerated claims of the Union, the
public interest against the interests of private citizens, and the
conservative spirit of order against the fleeting innovations of
democracy. Their power is enormous, but it is clothed in the authority
of public opinion. They are the all-powerful guardians of a people
which respects law, but they would be impotent against popular neglect
or popular contempt. The force of public opinion is the most
intractable of agents, because its exact limits cannot be defined; and
it is not less dangerous to exceed than to remain below the boundary
prescribed.
The Federal judges must not only be good citizens, and men possessed of
that information and integrity which are indispensable to magistrates,
but they must be statesmen—politicians, not unread in the signs of the
times, not afraid to brave the obstacles which can be subdued, nor slow
to turn aside such encroaching elements as may threaten the supremacy
of the Union and the obedience which is due to the laws.
The President, who exercises a limited power, may err without causing
great mischief in the State. Congress may decide amiss without
destroying the Union, because the electoral body in which Congress
originates may cause it to retract its decision by changing its
members. But if the Supreme Court is ever composed of imprudent men or
bad citizens, the Union may be plunged into anarchy or civil war.
The real cause of this danger, however, does not lie in the
constitution of the tribunal, but in the very nature of Federal
Governments. We have observed that in confederate peoples it is
especially necessary to consolidate the judicial authority, because in
no other nations do those independent persons who are able to cope with
the social body exist in greater power or in a better condition to
resist the physical strength of the Government. But the more a power
requires to be strengthened, the more extensive and independent it must
be made; and the dangers which its abuse may create are heightened by
its independence and its strength. The source of the evil is not,
therefore, in the constitution of the power, but in the constitution of
those States which render its existence necessary.
In What Respects The Federal Constitution Is Superior To That Of The
States
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