Democracy in America — Volume 1Tocqueville, Alexis de
History
Democracy in America — Volume 1
Tocqueville, Alexis de
Democracy -- United States; United States -- Politics and government; United States -- Social conditions
The Federal Constitution, as well as the Constitutions of the different
States, divided the legislative body into two branches. But in the
States these two branches were composed of the same elements, and
elected in the same manner. The consequence was that the passions and
inclinations of the populace were as rapidly and as energetically
represented in one chamber as in the other, and that laws were made
with all the characteristics of violence and precipitation. By the
Federal Constitution the two houses originate in like manner in the
choice of the people; but the conditions of eligibility and the mode of
election were changed, to the end that, if, as is the case in certain
nations, one branch of the Legislature represents the same interests as
the other, it may at least represent a superior degree of intelligence
and discretion. A mature age was made one of the conditions of the
senatorial dignity, and the Upper House was chosen by an elected
assembly of a limited number of members.
To concentrate the whole social force in the hands of the legislative
body is the natural tendency of democracies; for as this is the power
which emanates the most directly from the people, it is made to
participate most fully in the preponderating authority of the
multitude, and it is naturally led to monopolize every species of
influence. This concentration is at once prejudicial to a
well-conducted administration, and favorable to the despotism of the
majority. The legislators of the States frequently yielded to these
democratic propensities, which were invariably and courageously
resisted by the founders of the Union.
In the States the executive power is vested in the hands of a
magistrate, who is apparently placed upon a level with the Legislature,
but who is in reality nothing more than the blind agent and the passive
instrument of its decisions. He can derive no influence from the
duration of his functions, which terminate with the revolving year, or
from the exercise of prerogatives which can scarcely be said to exist.
The Legislature can condemn him to inaction by intrusting the execution
of the laws to special committees of its own members, and can annul his
temporary dignity by depriving him of his salary. The Federal
Constitution vests all the privileges and all the responsibility of the
executive power in a single individual. The duration of the Presidency
is fixed at four years; the salary of the individual who fills that
office cannot be altered during the term of his functions; he is
protected by a body of official dependents, and armed with a suspensive
veto. In short, every effort was made to confer a strong and
independent position upon the executive authority within the limits
which had been prescribed to it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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