Democracy in America — Volume 1Tocqueville, Alexis de
History
Democracy in America — Volume 1
Tocqueville, Alexis de
Democracy -- United States; United States -- Politics and government; United States -- Social conditions
In all the confederations which had been formed before the American
Union the Federal Government demanded its supplies at the hands of the
separate Governments; and if the measure it prescribed was onerous to
any one of those bodies means were found to evade its claims: if the
State was powerful, it had recourse to arms; if it was weak, it
connived at the resistance which the law of the Union, its sovereign,
met with, and resorted to inaction under the plea of inability. Under
these circumstances one of the two alternatives has invariably
occurred; either the most preponderant of the allied peoples has
assumed the privileges of the Federal authority and ruled all the
States in its name, *p or the Federal Government has been abandoned by
its natural supporters, anarchy has arisen between the confederates,
and the Union has lost all powers of action. *q
p
[ This was the case in Greece, when Philip undertook to execute the
decree of the Amphictyons; in the Low Countries, where the province of
Holland always gave the law; and, in our own time, in the Germanic
Confederation, in which Austria and Prussia assume a great degree of
influence over the whole country, in the name of the Diet.]
q
[ Such has always been the situation of the Swiss Confederation, which
would have perished ages ago but for the mutual jealousies of its
neighbors.]
In America the subjects of the Union are not States, but private
citizens: the national Government levies a tax, not upon the State of
Massachusetts, but upon each inhabitant of Massachusetts. All former
confederate governments presided over communities, but that of the
Union rules individuals; its force is not borrowed, but self-derived;
and it is served by its own civil and military officers, by its own
army, and its own courts of justice. It cannot be doubted that the
spirit of the nation, the passions of the multitude, and the provincial
prejudices of each State tend singularly to diminish the authority of a
Federal authority thus constituted, and to facilitate the means of
resistance to its mandates; but the comparative weakness of a
restricted sovereignty is an evil inherent in the Federal system. In
America, each State has fewer opportunities of resistance and fewer
temptations to non-compliance; nor can such a design be put in
execution (if indeed it be entertained) without an open violation of
the laws of the Union, a direct interruption of the ordinary course of
justice, and a bold declaration of revolt; in a word, without taking a
decisive step which men hesitate to adopt.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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