Democracy in America — Volume 1Tocqueville, Alexis de
History
Democracy in America — Volume 1
Tocqueville, Alexis de
Democracy -- United States; United States -- Politics and government; United States -- Social conditions
The second and the most fatal of all the defects I have alluded to, and
that which I believe to be inherent in the federal system, is the
relative weakness of the government of the Union. The principle upon
which all confederations rest is that of a divided sovereignty. The
legislator may render this partition less perceptible, he may even
conceal it for a time from the public eye, but he cannot prevent it
from existing, and a divided sovereignty must always be less powerful
than an entire supremacy. The reader has seen in the remarks I have
made on the Constitution of the United States that the Americans have
displayed singular ingenuity in combining the restriction of the power
of the Union within the narrow limits of a federal government with the
semblance and, to a certain extent, with the force of a national
government. By this means the legislators of the Union have succeeded
in diminishing, though not in counteracting the natural danger of
confederations.
It has been remarked that the American Government does not apply itself
to the States, but that it immediately transmits its injunctions to the
citizens, and compels them as isolated individuals to comply with its
demands. But if the Federal law were to clash with the interests and
the prejudices of a State, it might be feared that all the citizens of
that State would conceive themselves to be interested in the cause of a
single individual who should refuse to obey. If all the citizens of the
State were aggrieved at the same time and in the same manner by the
authority of the Union, the Federal Government would vainly attempt to
subdue them individually; they would instinctively unite in a common
defence, and they would derive a ready-prepared organization from the
share of sovereignty which the institution of their State allows them
to enjoy. Fiction would give way to reality, and an organized portion
of the territory might then contest the central authority. *t The same
observation holds good with regard to the Federal jurisdiction. If the
courts of the Union violated an important law of a State in a private
case, the real, if not the apparent, contest would arise between the
aggrieved State represented by a citizen and the Union represented by
its courts of justice. *u
t
[ [This is precisely what occurred in 1862, and the following paragraph
describes correctly the feelings and notions of the South. General Lee
held that his primary allegiance was due, not to the Union, but to
Virginia.]]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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