Democracy in America — Volume 1Tocqueville, Alexis de
History
Democracy in America — Volume 1
Tocqueville, Alexis de
Democracy -- United States; United States -- Politics and government; United States -- Social conditions
The more we reflect upon all that occurs in the United States the more
shall we be persuaded that the lawyers as a body form the most
powerful, if not the only, counterpoise to the democratic element. In
that country we perceive how eminently the legal profession is
qualified by its powers, and even by its defects, to neutralize the
vices which are inherent in popular government. When the American
people is intoxicated by passion, or carried away by the impetuosity of
its ideas, it is checked and stopped by the almost invisible influence
of its legal counsellors, who secretly oppose their aristocratic
propensities to its democratic instincts, their superstitious
attachment to what is antique to its love of novelty, their narrow
views to its immense designs, and their habitual procrastination to its
ardent impatience.
The courts of justice are the most visible organs by which the legal
profession is enabled to control the democracy. The judge is a lawyer,
who, independently of the taste for regularity and order which he has
contracted in the study of legislation, derives an additional love of
stability from his own inalienable functions. His legal attainments
have already raised him to a distinguished rank amongst his
fellow-citizens; his political power completes the distinction of his
station, and gives him the inclinations natural to privileged classes.
Armed with the power of declaring the laws to be unconstitutional, *a
the American magistrate perpetually interferes in political affairs. He
cannot force the people to make laws, but at least he can oblige it not
to disobey its own enactments; or to act inconsistently with its own
principles. I am aware that a secret tendency to diminish the judicial
power exists in the United States, and by most of the constitutions of
the several States the Government can, upon the demand of the two
houses of the legislature, remove the judges from their station. By
some other constitutions the members of the tribunals are elected, and
they are even subjected to frequent re-elections. I venture to predict
that these innovations will sooner or later be attended with fatal
consequences, and that it will be found out at some future period that
the attack which is made upon the judicial power has affected the
democratic republic itself.
a
[ See chapter VI. on the “Judicial Power in the United States.”]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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