Democracy in America — Volume 2Tocqueville, Alexis de
Philosophy
Democracy in America — Volume 2
Tocqueville, Alexis de
Democracy -- United States; United States -- Politics and government; United States -- Social conditions
As honor, amongst democratic nations, is imperfectly defined, its
influence is of course less powerful; for it is difficult to apply
with certainty and firmness a law which is not distinctly known. Public
opinion, the natural and supreme interpreter of the laws of honor, not
clearly discerning to which side censure or approval ought to lean,
can only pronounce a hesitating judgment. Sometimes the opinion of the
public may contradict itself; more frequently it does not act, and lets
things pass.
The weakness of the sense of honor in democracies also arises from
several other causes. In aristocratic countries, the same notions of
honor are always entertained by only a few persons, always limited in
number, often separated from the rest of their fellow-citizens. Honor is
easily mingled and identified in their minds with the idea of all
that distinguishes their own position; it appears to them as the chief
characteristic of their own rank; they apply its different rules with
all the warmth of personal interest, and they feel (if I may use the
expression) a passion for complying with its dictates. This truth is
extremely obvious in the old black-letter lawbooks on the subject of
"trial by battel." The nobles, in their disputes, were bound to use
the lance and sword; whereas the villains used only sticks amongst
themselves, "inasmuch as," to use the words of the old books, "villains
have no honor." This did not mean, as it may be imagined at the present
day, that these people were contemptible; but simply that their actions
were not to be judged by the same rules which were applied to the
actions of the aristocracy.
It is surprising, at first sight, that when the sense of honor is most
predominant, its injunctions are usually most strange; so that the
further it is removed from common reason the better it is obeyed; whence
it has sometimes been inferred that the laws of honor were strengthened
by their own extravagance. The two things indeed originate from the
same source, but the one is not derived from the other. Honor becomes
fantastical in proportion to the peculiarity of the wants which it
denotes, and the paucity of the men by whom those wants are felt; and
it is because it denotes wants of this kind that its influence is great.
Thus the notion of honor is not the stronger for being fantastical, but
it is fantastical and strong from the selfsame cause.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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