their swimming well and being lightly equipped succeeded easily in climbing upon others, the attackers were at a corresponding disadvantage. Meantime the rapidity with which the ships of the one party could sail proved an offset to the solidity of those on the other side, and the heaviness of the latter counterbalanced the agility of the former. [-4-] Late in the day, near nightfall, Caesar's party finally conquered, but instituted no pursuit: the reason as it appears to me and may be conjectured from probability was that they could not overtake the fleeing ships and were afraid of running aground in the shallows, with which they were unacquainted, near the coast. Some say that Agrippa because he was battling for Caesar and not for himself thought it sufficient merely to rout his adversaries. For he had been in the habit of saying to his most intimate associates that the majority of those holding sovereign power wish no one to display more ability than themselves; and that they attended personally to nearly all such matters as afford them a conquest without effort, but assign the less favorable and more complicated business to others. And if they ever are forced to entrust some choice enterprise to their assistants, they are irritated and displeased at the latter's renown. They do not pray that these subordinates may be defeated and fare badly, yet they do not choose to have them win a complete success and secure glory from it. His advice therefore was that the man who intended to survive must relieve his masters of the annoyance incident to such undertakings and still reserve for them the successful completion of the work. As for me, I know that the above is regularly true and that Agrippa paid attention to it, but I am not setting down that on that particular occasion this was the cause of his failure to pursue. For he was not able, no matter how much he might have desired it, to follow up the foe.