Discourses on the First Decade of Titus LiviusMachiavelli, Niccolò
Philosophy
Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius
Machiavelli, Niccolò
Livy. Ab urbe condita; Political science -- Early works to 1800; Rome -- Historiography
Recent opinions are likewise cited as favouring this view. Every one
knows how Ferrando, king of Naples, was in his day accounted a most
wise prince; and how two years before his death there came a rumour
that Charles VIII of France was meditating an attack upon him; and how,
after making great preparations for his defence, he sickened; and being
on the point of death, among other counsels left his son Alfonso this
advice, that nothing in the world should tempt him to pass out of his
own territory, but to await the enemy within his frontier, and with his
forces unimpaired; a warning disregarded by Alfonso, who sent into
Romagna an army, which he lost, and with it his whole dominions,
without a battle.
Other arguments on both sides of the question in addition to those
already noticed, are as follows: He who attacks shows higher courage
than he who stands on his defence, and this gives his army greater
confidence. Moreover, by attacking your enemy you deprive him of many
opportunities for using his resources, since he can receive no aid from
subjects who have been stripped of their possessions; and when an enemy
is at his gates, a prince must be careful how he levies money and
imposes taxes; so that, as Hannibal said, the springs which enable a
country to support a war come to be dried up. Again, the soldiers of an
invader, finding themselves in a foreign land, are under a stronger
necessity to fight, and necessity, as has often been said, is the
parent of valour.
On the other hand, it may be argued that there are many advantages to
be gained by awaiting the attack of your enemy. For without putting
yourself much about, you may harass him by intercepting his supplies,
whether of victual or of whatsoever else an army stands in need: from
your better knowledge of the country you can impede his movements; and
because men muster more willingly to defend their homes than to go on
distant expeditions, you can meet him with more numerous forces, if
defeated you can more easily repair your strength, because the bulk of
your army, finding shelter at hand, will be able to save itself, and
your reserves will have no distance to come. In this way you can use
your whole strength without risking your entire fortunes; whereas, in
leaving your country, you risk your entire fortunes, without putting
forth your whole strength. Nay, we find that to weaken an adversary
still further, some have suffered him to make a march of several days
into their country, and then to capture certain of their towns, that by
leaving garrisons in these, he might reduce the numbers of his army,
and so be attacked at greater disadvantage.
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