Discourses on the First Decade of Titus LiviusMachiavelli, Niccolò
Philosophy
Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius
Machiavelli, Niccolò
Livy. Ab urbe condita; Political science -- Early works to 1800; Rome -- Historiography
Of these methods of attack, the first, wherein the city was entirely
surrounded, exposed the defenders to more sudden perils and left them
more doubtful remedies. For while it was necessary for them to have a
sufficient force at all points, it might happen that the forces at
their disposal were not numerous enough to be everywhere at once, or to
relieve one another. Or if their numbers were sufficient, they might
not all be equally resolute in standing their ground, and their failure
at any one point involved a general defeat. Consequently, as I have
said, this method of attack was often successful. But when it did not
succeed at the first, it was rarely renewed, being a method dangerous
to the attacking army, which having to secure itself along an extended
line, was left everywhere too weak to resist a sally made from the
town; nay, of itself, was apt to fall into confusion and disorder. This
method of attack, therefore, could be attempted once only and by way of
surprise.
Against breaches in the walls the defence was, as at the present day,
to throw up new works; while mines were met by counter-mines, in which
the enemy were either withstood at the point of the sword, or baffled
by some other warlike contrivance; as by filling casks with feathers,
which, being set on fire and placed in the mine, choked out the
assailants by their smoke and stench. Where towers were employed for
the attack, the defenders sought to destroy them with fire; and where
mounds of earth were thrown up against the walls, they would dig holes
at the base of the wall against which the mound rested, and carry off
the earth which the enemy were heaping up; which, being removed from
within as fast as it was thrown up from without, the mound made no
progress.
None of these methods of attack can long be persisted in and the
assailant, if unsuccessful, must either strike his camp and seek
victory in some other direction, as Scipio did when he invaded Africa
and, after failing in the attempt to storm Utica, withdrew from his
attack on that town and turned his strength against the Carthaginian
army in the field; or else recourse must be had to regular siege, as by
the Romans at Veii, Capua, Carthage, Jerusalem, and divers other cities
which they reduced in this way.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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