Discourses on the First Decade of Titus LiviusMachiavelli, Niccolò
Philosophy
Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius
Machiavelli, Niccolò
Livy. Ab urbe condita; Political science -- Early works to 1800; Rome -- Historiography
Had this method, which has been followed by all who have successfully
established tyrannies in republics, been followed by Appius, his power
would have been more stable and lasting; whereas, taking the directly
opposite course, he could not have acted more unwisely than he did. For
in his eagerness to grasp the tyranny, he made himself obnoxious to
those who were in fact conferring it, and who could have maintained him
in it; and he destroyed those who were his friends, while he sought
friendship from those from whom he could not have it. For although it
be the desire of the nobles to tyrannize, that section of them which
finds itself outside the tyranny is always hostile to the tyrant, who
can never succeed in gaining over the entire body of the nobles by
reason of their greed and ambition; for no tyrant can ever have honours
or wealth enough to satisfy them all.
In abandoning the people, therefore, and siding with the nobles, Appius
committed a manifest mistake, as well for the reasons above given, as
because to hold a thing by force, he who uses force must needs be
stronger than he against whom it is used. Whence it happens that those
tyrants who have the mass of the people for their friends and the
nobles for their enemies, are more secure than those who have the
people for their enemies and the nobles for their friends; because in
the former case their authority has the stronger support. For with such
support a ruler can maintain himself by the internal strength of his
State, as did Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, when attacked by the Romans and
by the whole of Greece; for making sure work with the nobles, who were
few in number, and having the people on his side, he was able with
their assistance to defend himself; which he could not have done had
they been against him. But in the case of a city, wherein the tyrant
has few friends, its internal strength will not avail him for its
defence, and he will have to seek aid from without in one of three
shapes. For either he must hire foreign guards to defend his person; or
he must arm the peasantry, so that they may play the part which ought
to be played by the citizens; or he must league with powerful
neighbours for his defence. He who follows these methods and observes
them well, may contrive to save himself, though he has the people for
his enemy. But Appius could not follow the plan of gaining over the
peasantry, since in Rome they and the people were one. And what he
might have done he knew not how to do, and so was ruined at the very
outset.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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