The relative insignificance of the sum which would be saved at a low rate might sometimes, indeed, deter a person from saving for testamentary purposes. With the rate at six per cent., a man might be willing to save six hundred dollars a year for a sufficiently long period to provide a legacy of twenty thousand dollars to an educational institution. With the rate at one and one-half per cent., the amount that he could hope to accumulate would be so much smaller that it might seem to him not worth while, and he would decline to save the six hundred dollars annually. Cases of this kind, however, always involve the secondary objects of saving, the luxuries rather than the necessaries of testamentary transmission. They do not include such primary objects as provision for one's family. When the average man finds that he cannot leave to his family as much as he would desire, as much as he would have bequeathed to them at a higher rate of interest, he will strive to increase rather than decrease his efforts to save for this purpose. Speaking generally, then, we conclude that the assumption underlying Professor Cassel's theory is contradicted by our experience of human motives and practices. Men who save mainly for a future interest-income, at the same time wishing to keep the principal intact until death, and who could have fully realised this desire under a high interest régime, will not become entirely indifferent to it when they find that they cannot attain it completely. They will ordinarily try to leave behind them as large a capital or principal as they can. Hence they will save more rather than less. _Whether Any Interest Is Necessary_