Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of WealthRyan, John A. (John Augustine)
PhilosophyChristian
Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth
Ryan, John A. (John Augustine)
Economic history; Income distribution -- Moral and ethical aspects; Wealth -- Religious aspects
With interest abolished, those persons who were willing to subordinate
present secondary satisfactions to the primary future needs of
themselves and their families, would save at least as much for these
purposes as when they could have obtained interest. Most of them would
probably save more in order to render their future provision as nearly
as possible equal to what it would have been had interest accrued on
their annual savings. Whether a person intended to leave all his
accumulations, or part of them, or none of them to posterity, he would
still desire them to be as large as they might have been in a régime
of interest. In order to realise this desire, he would be compelled to
increase his savings. And it is reasonable to expect that this is
precisely the course that would be followed by men of average thrift
and foresight. Such men regard future necessaries and comforts,
whether for themselves or their children, as more important than
present non-essentials and luxuries. Interest or no interest, prudent
men will subordinate the latter goods to the former, and will save
money accordingly.
When, however, both future and present goods are of the same order and
importance, the future is no longer preferred to the present. In that
case the preference is reversed. The luxuries of to-day are more
keenly prized than the luxuries of to-morrow. If the latter are to be
preferred they must possess some advantage over the luxuries that
might be obtained here and now. Such advantage may arise in various
ways; for example, when a man decides that he will have more leisure
for a foreign journey two years hence than this year, or when he
prefers a large amount of future enjoyment at one time to present
satisfactions taken in small doses. But the most general method of
conferring advantage upon the secondary satisfactions of the future as
compared with those of the present, is to increase the quantity. The
majority of foreseeing persons are willing to pass by one hundred
dollars' worth of enjoyment now for the sake of one hundred and five
dollars' worth one year hence. This advantage of quantity is provided
through the receipt of interest. It affects all those persons whose
saving, as noted in the last chapter, involves a sacrifice for which
the only adequate compensation is interest, and likewise all those
persons who are in a position to choose between present and future
luxuries. Were interest suppressed these classes of persons would
cease to save for this kind of future goods.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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