If, however, we assume that no considerable amount of evil would follow, or that the balance of results would be favourable, the question of the proper action of the State becomes somewhat complex. In the first place, interest could not rightfully be suppressed while the private taking of rent remained. To adopt such a course would be to treat the receivers of property incomes inequitably. Landowners would continue to receive an income from their property, while capital owners would not; yet the moral claims of the former to income are no better than those of the latter. In the second place, the State would be obliged to compensate the owners of existing capital instruments for the decline in value which, as we have already seen, would occur when the item of interest was eliminated from the cost of reproducing such capital instruments. It would likewise be under moral obligation to compensate landowners for whatever decrease in value befell their property as a result of the abolition of rent. Nevertheless, the practical difficulties confronting the legal abolition of interest are apparently so great as to render the attempt socially unwise and futile. In order to be effective the prohibition would have to be international. Were it enforced in only one or in a few countries, these would suffer far more through the flight of capital than they would gain through the abolition of interest. The technical obstacles in any case would be well nigh insuperable. If the attempt were made to suppress interest on producing capital, as well as on loans, the civil authorities would be unable to determine with any degree of precision what part of the gross returns of a business was pure interest, and what part was a necessary compensation for risk and the labour of management. Should the State try to solve this problem by allowing the directors of industry varying salaries to correspond with their comparative degrees of efficiency, and different rates of insurance-payments to represent the different risks, it would inevitably make some allowances so low as to discourage labour and enterprise, and others so high as to give the recipients a considerable amount of pure interest in the guise of profits and salaries. Should it fix a flat rate of salaries and profits, the more efficient undertakers would refuse to put forth their best efforts, and the more perilous enterprises would not be undertaken. The supervision of expenses, receipts, and other details of business that would be required to prevent evasion of the law, would not improbably cost more than the total amount now paid in the form of interest. On the other hand, if the method of suppression were confined to loans it would probably prove only a little less futile than the effort to abolish interest on productive capital. The great majority of those who were prevented from lending at interest would invest their money in stocks, land, buildings, and other forms of productive property.