When the public authorities either fail entirely to regulate charges, or do so only spasmodically and partially, the quasi-public monopoly will not necessarily have a right to all the obtainable surplus gains. For a long time the express companies of the United States were permitted to exact what charges they pleased, and even yet the rates on some of our railroads are not adequately regulated by the State. In such cases the charges imposed on the public are not an adequate expression of the social estimate of justice, nor an adequate basis of legitimate surplus gains. In the absence of sufficient public regulation, a quasi-public monopoly is morally bound to fix its charges at such a level as will enable it to obtain only the prevailing rate of interest on the investment, and such surplus gains as it can produce through exceptional efficiency. In all such cases the public service corporation is in the same moral position as the artificial monopoly: it has no possible basis except superior efficiency for claiming or getting any returns above the competitive rate of interest on its capital. Its only possible reason for obtaining more is the fact that it has the power to take more. This fact has obviously no moral validity. _Methods of Preventing Monopolistic Injustice_ How shall the injustices of monopoly be prevented in the future? So far as quasi-public monopolies are concerned, all students of the subject are now agreed that these should be permitted to exist under adequate governmental regulation as to prices and service. The reason is that in this field successful and useful competition is impossible. Public utility corporations are natural monopolies, and must be dealt with by the method of regulation until such time as they are brought under the ownership and operation of the State. With regard to the great industrial combinations which have become or threaten to become artificial monopolies, there exists substantial agreement among competent authorities on one point, and disagreement on another point. All admit that the unfair competitive methods described in an earlier part of this chapter should be stringently prohibited. No possible reason can be found for legal toleration of these or any other discriminative, uncharitable, or unjust practices on the part of stronger toward weaker competitors.