Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of WealthRyan, John A. (John Augustine)
PhilosophyChristian
Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth
Ryan, John A. (John Augustine)
Economic history; Income distribution -- Moral and ethical aspects; Wealth -- Religious aspects
So much for the welfare and rights of the beneficiaries of
inheritance. The owners of estates would not be injured in their
rights of property by the limitation that we are here considering. In
the first place, the number of persons practically affected by the
limitation would be extremely small. Only an insignificant fraction of
property owners ever transmit or expect to be wealthy enough to
transmit to their families more than one million dollars. Of these few
a considerable proportion would not be deterred by the million dollar
limitation from putting forth their best and greatest efforts in a
productive way. They would continue to work either from force of habit
and love of their accustomed tasks, or from a desire to make large
gifts to their heirs during life, or because they wished to assist
some benevolent enterprise. The infinitesimally small number whose
energies would be diminished by the limitation could very safely be
treated as a socially negligible element. The community would be
better off without them.
The limitation of inheritance would, indeed, be liable to abuse.
Circumstances would undoubtedly arise in which the community would be
strongly tempted to make the maximum inheritable amount so low as to
discourage the desire of acquisition, and to deprive heirs of
reasonable protection. While the bad effects of such a limitation
would not be as great as those following a similar abuse with regard
to possessions, they are sufficiently grave and sufficiently probable
to suggest that the legal restriction of bequest and succession should
not be considered except as a last resort, and when the transmission
of great fortunes had become a great and certain public evil.
It seems reasonable to conclude, then, that neither the limitation of
possessions nor the limitation of inheritance is necessarily a direct
violation of the right of property, but that the possible and even
probable evil consequences of both are so grave as to make these
measures of very doubtful benefit. Whether the dangers in question are
sufficiently great to render the adoption of either proposal morally
wrong, is a question that cannot be answered with any degree of
confidence. What seems to be fairly certain is that in our present
conditions legislation of this sort would be an unnecessary and unwise
experiment.
_Limitation Through Progressive Taxation_
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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