entirely, or nearly so, without consciousness. No doubt man's brain includes some hereditary mechanisms, but in the main it distinctively consists of nerve-mechanisms, formed by his own individual education, acting on receptive and specially educable brain matter. And the brain mechanism formed by education is of greater life-saving value than is that of the inherited instincts which meet general emergencies, but not those new and special to the individual. The third step in the development of mind is the arrival (for one can call it by no other term) of that condition which we call "consciousness"--the power of saying to oneself "I am I," and of looking on as a detached existence not only at other existences but at one's own mental processes, feelings, and movements. With it comes thought, knowledge, reason, and will. We may speak of consciousness as invading or spreading gradually over the territory of mind. All the three steps of the growth of mind which I have distinguished can be seen following one on the other in the growth of a human child from infancy to adolescence. The second step--the development of individual mechanisms due to memory--is not in most animals, and not entirely in man, pervaded by or "within the area of" consciousness. Memory is at first "unconscious memory," and there still remains in man a capacity for forming "memory" which never (or in some matters only exceptionally) becomes illuminated by consciousness. Apparently the inherited mechanisms which we call "instincts" are never within the reach of consciousness, though, of course, the actions determined by them are. It is a difficult matter to decide how far the memory of apes, dogs, and such animals nearest to man is conscious memory. Probably very little. But it is only when memory, as well as the impression of the moment, is pervaded by consciousness that reflection, and reason and action dependent on reason, are possible.[6] [6] I have alluded to this subject again, necessarily with some repetition in the chapter on "The Mind of Apes and of Man," p. 262.