So in respect to the argument from the Strongest Motive, which, by definition, is fixed upon as the Motive in the direction of which the Will, in each particular instance, acts. From the fact that the action of the Will is always in the direction of this Motive, that is, in the direction of the Motive towards which it does act, the conclusion is gravely drawn, that the Will is and must be subject, in all its determinations, to the law of Necessity. I find my mind acted upon by two opposite Motives. I cannot tell which is the strongest, from a contemplation of what is intrinsic in the Motives themselves, nor from their effects upon my Intelligence or Sensibility. I must wait till my Will has acted. From the fact of its action in the direction of one Motive, in distinction from the other, I must then draw two important conclusions. 1. The Motive, in the direction of which my Will did act, is the strongest. The evidence is, the _fact_ of its action in that direction. 2. The Will must be subject to the law of Necessity. The proof is, the action of the Will in the direction of the Strongest Motive, that is, the Motive in the direction of which it did act. Sage argument to be regarded by Philosophers and Theologians of the 19th century, as possessing the elements of immortality! (5.) His argument from the Divine fore-knowledge has been shown to be wholly based upon an _assumption_ unauthorized by reason, or revelation either, to wit: that he understands the _mode_ of that Fore-knowledge,-- an assumption which cannot be made except through ignorance, as was true in his case, without the greatest impiety and presumption. (6.) The theory which Edwards opposes has been shown to render sacred, in all minds that hold it, the great idea of _duty_, of moral obligation; while the validity of that idea has never, in any age or nation, been denied, excepting on the avowed authority of his Theory. (7.) All the arguments in proof of the doctrine of Necessity, with the single exception of that from the Divine Fore-knowledge--an argument resting, as we have seen, upon an assumption equally baseless,--involve a begging of the question at issue. Take any argument we please, with this one exception, and it will be seen at once that it has no force at all, unless the truth of the doctrine designed to be established by it, be assumed as the basis of that argument. Shall we pretend that a Theory, that has been fully demonstrated to involve, fundamentally, the errors, absurdities, and contradictions above named, has not been answered? WILLING, AND AIMING TO PERFORM IMPOSSIBILITIES. 5. We are now prepared to answer a question about which philosophers have been somewhat divided in opinion--the question, whether the Will can act in the direction of perceived and affirmed impossibilities? The true answer to this question, doubtless is, that the Mind may _will_ the occurrence of a known impossibility, but it can never _aim_ to produce such an occurrence.