(3.) The great object of God in creation and providence was and is, to produce the greatest possible amount of holiness and consequent happiness, and to prevent, in every possible way consistent with this end, the existence of sin, and consequently of misery.--Now if creatures perish under such an influence, they perish by their own fault. SIN A MYSTERY. 5. I have a single remark to make upon those phenomena of the Will, in which evil is chosen instead of good, or sin instead of holiness. That all intelligent beings possess the power to make such a choice, is a fact affirmed by universal consciousness. But that any being, under any circumstances, should make such a choice, and that he should for ever refuse to return to the paths of virtue, notwithstanding his experience of the consequences of sin, is an abuse of human liberty, which must for ever remain an inexplicable mystery. When a being assigns the real reason in view of which right is chosen, we are always satisfied with such reason. But we are never satisfied with the reason for the opposite course. CONCLUSION FROM THE ABOVE. One conclusion forces itself upon us, from that view of the Divine government which consists with the doctrine of Liberty. The aspect of that government which results from this view of the subject commends itself to the reason and conscience of the intelligent universe. _Mysteries_ we do and must find in it; but _absurdities_ and _contradictions_, never. Under such a Government, no being is condemned for what he cannot avoid, nor rewarded for what he could but do. While "God sits on no precarious throne, Nor borrows leave to be," the destiny of the creature turns upon his own deserts, his own choice of good or evil. The elucidation of the principles of such a government "commends itself to every man's conscience in the sight of God." CHAPTER VIII. OBLIGATION PREDICABLE ONLY OF THE WILL. SECTION I. THE Will, as I have already said, exists in a trinity with the Intelligence and Sensibility. In respect to the operations of the different departments of our mental being, I lay down the two following propositions: 1. Obligation, moral desert, &c., are directly predicable only of the action of the Will. 2. For the operations of the other faculties we are accountable so far forth only as the existence and character of such operations depend upon the Will. In other words, it is for voluntary acts and states only that we are accountable. This I argue because, 1. Obligation, as we have seen, consists only with Liberty. All the phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility, in the circumstances of their occurrence, are not free, but necessary. Accountability, therefore, cannot be predicated of such phenomena. We may be, and are, accountable for such phenomena, so far forth as their existence and character depend upon the Will: in other words, so far forth as they are voluntary, and not involuntary, states of mind.